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Partnership Advocacy in World Bank 
Environmental Reform 
David A. Wirth 
The . mistake the bank has paid the highest price for 1s not recognizing the 
importance of the environment. 
-World Bank President Lewis T. Preston 1 
Uniti in vita e in morte 
Entrambi trovera. 
-Don Alvaro and Don Carlo in La Forza de/ Destino2 
Notwithstanding the copious literature on the environmental impacts 
of the World Bank's3 lending activities in borrowing countries,4 little at-
tempt has been made to analyze the methods by which nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) undertake to catalyze policy change at that in-
stitution. Since at least the early 1970s, public interest environmental 
groups in the United States have systematically and successfully pro-
moted major policy changes on the domestic level on a wide-ranging 
environmental agenda, including restoration of air and water quality, 
exposure to environmental toxins, management of public lands, pro-
tection of endangered species, and regulation of pesticide use. But efforts 
to improve the World Bank's environmental performance, led by many 
of those same organizations, differ in significant respects from the model 
of domestic U.S. public policy advocacy on the environment. An exami-
nation of the mechanics of the campaign to encourage environmental 
reform of the World Bank is illustrative not only in revealing the dy-
namics underlying the international environmental NGO movement, but 
also in exposing the inner workings of the Bank as an institution. This 
chapter focuses on relationships between U.S. groups-particularly those 
with a presence in Washington, D.C., the headquarters of the World 
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Bank-and counterpart organizations in the Third World and Western 
Europe. 
Partnership Advocacy and the Case Study Approach to Environmental 
Reform 
Over time, the NGO-initiated World Bank environmental reform cam-
paign has come to be characterized by an approach that might fairly be 
termed partnership advocacy. Cooperation among Washington-based 
advocacy NGOs and counterparts in other donor and recipient countries 
has become so deeply entrenched in NGOs' interventions with the Bank 
as to have become an essential component of the reform effort. 
The case study approach, based on a critique of demonstrable prob-
lems with specific projects, has been the principal modus operandi of 
advocacy NGOs for influencing both specific projects and broader, 
generic policies. This approach has been perhaps most obvious in cam-
paigns to influence particular Bank-financed infrastructure projects, such 
as large dams. In such cases, the necessity for a local perspective and 
accurate on-the-ground information is readily apparent. In such situa-
tions, the nexus between Bank-financed activities and the effects of those 
activities is often clear and immediate, the impacts are highly focused on 
identifiable individuals and communities, and the need for those voices to 
be heard is consequently often apparent. Case studies crystallize attention 
around a concrete, immediate problem, while raising broader issues of 
Bank policy and accountability. 
Because of the importance of the case study approach to influencing 
the Bank; partnerships that focus on a particular Bank-financed project, 
as opposed to a generic Bank policy that affects all borrowers, can have 
an especially great impact both on projects and policies. Where campaigns 
start with efforts to influence broader policies, however, agreement on 
campaign goals often involves more players and usually much more 
diverse constituencies with potentially divergent agendas. Moreover, 
campaigns with clear time lines and goals (often imposed by project 
cycles) typically tend to be more coherent than more open-ended policy 
dialogues. 
The case study method can nonetheless be expanded to address 
broader policies. Through a process of induction, analyses of specific 
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project loans become particularized expressions of generic or systemic 
difficulties and can be used as a tool to leverage change on those more 
general policies. For example, jn January 1989, the World Bank, under 
NGO scrutiny, indefinitely deferred consideration of a proposed $500 
million electric sector loan to Brazil that would have supported that 
country's nuclear energy program and a power expansion agenda in-
volving up to seventy-nine dams in the Amazon basin.5 Here, a loan-
specific campaign raised broader issues of policy. In the most notable 
precedent set by a project-focused campaign, an independent, ad hoc re-
view of the Sardar Sarovar Dam projects in India "inspired" the creation 
of a new Inspection Panel with the power to report on the adequacy of 
Bank staff's compliance with the institution's own policies in the context 
of particular loans.6 Before describing the various forms that partnership 
advocacy takes in practice, however, it is instructive to analyze the reasons 
why this strategy has evolved. 
The Role of Partnership in Case Studies of Bank Lending 
The most hotly contested debates surrounding World Bank lending 
have often been factual questions concerning anticipated, ongoing, or 
completed Bank-financed development projects, some of which are quite 
complex and all of which are physically located outside the United States. 
By contrast, many of the more contentious U.S. domestic environmental 
disputes concern not the integrity of empirical evidence or scientific data, 
but the policy implications of specific information more or less agreed 
upon by various stakeholders-such as the environmental community, 
industry representatives, and governmental agencies. Environmental ad-
vocacy organizations often have little in the way of financial or technical 
resources to undertake independent efforts to monitor air or wattr quality, 
for example. As a consequence, in domestic environmental controversies, 
factual and scientific information generated by governmental authorities 
tends to dominate the policy debate. 
For members of the public in borrowing and donor countries alike, 
dealing with the World Bank requires a very different approach. Al-
though the situation has changed gradually and incrementally for the 
better in recent years, the Bank is still notoriously parsimonious with hard 
data concerning its actual operations, espeCially those under consideration 
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for future approval.7 Indeed, many of the documents critical to NGO 
campaigns became available only through unauthorized disclosures or 
"leaks" from the Bank. Further, because the necessity for wholesale en-
vironmental overhaul has been less than thoroughly internalized by the 
Bank's management, there is a continuing necessity to establish the fac-
tual predicate for policy reform. The consequence is a situation in which 
detailed, fact-specific case studies of particular loans, most often sup-
porting large-scale infrastructure projects, have been the engine that has 
driven the environmental reform campaign. 
Accordingly, international NGOs working on issues in which the 
World Bank is a critical player have engaged in "basic research" in a 
way that is much less necessary in the U.S. domestic arena. The evidence, 
moreover, is virtually always to be found abroad; thus, partnership with 
local counterparts becomes both desirable and necessary merely to col-
lect sufficient and minimally accurate information. As a result, the NGO 
reform effort more often than not has been characterized by disagree-
ments with the Bank over such basic information as the details of project 
design, the performance of borrowing government agencies, and the 
severity of actual or anticipated harm to the environment, public health, 
and quality of life. Although their environmental effects are somewhat 
less directly attributable to a particular Bank action and consequently 
more difficult to document, structural adjustment and sector loans, which 
do not finance an individual, readily identifiable infrastructure project, 
have nonetheless been successfully analyzed in case studies.8 
To be sure, NGOs have also made major challenges to broader Bank 
policies. One good example is the Tropical Forestry Action Plan (TFAP)-
an $8 billion joint undertaking of the Food and Agriculture Organization 
of the United Nations _{FAO), the United Nations Development Program 
{UNDP), and the Bank that was the subject of intense worldwide criti-
cism.9 Also, in 1989, the World Bank, after exposure in the press, aban-
doned a premature and ill-advised greenhouse gas policy that would have 
done nothing more than codify the status quo. 10 Even the Global Envi-
ronment Facility {GEF), established to support environmentally beneficial 
activities, has come in for its share of criticism.11 Environmental consid-
erations in sector loans-which may support governmental activities in 
an entire sector, such as energy, and which do not necessarily finance 
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specific infrastructure projects-and policy-based adjustment lending-
which targets macroeconomic variables such as exchange rates, govern-
ment deficits, and subsidies with the goal of fundamental economic 
reform-have also attracted attention from a policy perspective. Inter-
national campaigns targeted at influencing generic policies, however, 
have rarely had the same intensity or impact as the controversies sur-
rounding individual World Bank loans that support specific infrastruc-
ture projects, such as those discussed in the second section of this book.12 
The Role of Partnership in Influencing Multilateral Institutions 
The World Bank, simultaneously a multilateral organization and a bank, 
has an unusual governance structure that tends to insulate it from ex-
ternal NGO influence. The members and shareholders of the Bank are 
sovereign states, as represented by their governments. Each member state 
is represented by a governor, ordinarily that country's finance minister. 
The board of governors meets as a body only once a year and in practice 
gives only very general guidance to the Bank's professional staff. As 
of this writing, twenty-four executive directors, appointed or elected by 
member country governments, represent member nations in Washington 
on a day-to-day basis. They have offices physically located in the World 
Bank and make the final decisions on staff proposals for individual loans. 
As in the case of certain other donor states-Japan, Germany, the United 
Kingdom, and France-the U.S. executive qirector represents no other 
member states. Other executive directors represent groups of countries, 
some of them quite curious. For instance, one executive director repre-
sents the unlikely configuration of the Netherlands, Armenia, Bulgaria, 
Cyprus, Georgia, Israel, Moldova, Romania, and Ukraine. The individual 
generally identified as the "Canadian" executive director, a donor state, 
also represents most of the Caribbean countries, which are borrowers. 
The board considers more than two hundred loan decisions each year, 
taking decisions by weighted majority voting. Votes are allocated in 
proportion to a member state's shares and its capital contribution to the 
institution. So, as of this writing, among the 177 current members of 
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)-
the Bank's "hard" loan window-the United States exercises somewhat 
more than 17 percent of the total voting power, nearly three times as 
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much as the next largest shareholder, Japan. The situation in the Inter-
national Development Association (IDA), the Bank's "soft" loan window, 
is similar. 
The Bank's professional staff also has considerable autonomy in 
achieving a clearly identifiable, operational, on-the-ground mission: 
lending for economic development. The board typically operates by 
"consensus," implying unanimity. In the unusual situation in which a 
formal vote is taken, no single Bank member can defeat the approval of a 
loan proposal. Indeed, even the five largest donors to the Bank acting in 
concert could not, by themselves, assure that a particular loan proposal 
would be rejected. For the executive directors who represent groups of 
countries, particularly those configurations that include both donors and 
borrowers, the calculus before a negative vote is even more complex 
than for the large donors. Despite a handful of negative votes at the 
board level for environmental reasons, 13 effective and lasting change at 
the Bank requires structural and institutional changes among the Bank's 
management. Although a negative vote or an abstention by a member 
government can dramatically draw Bank management's attention to an 
issue such as the environment, that approach is rarely, if ever, successful 
in rejecting a staff proposal presented at the board level.14 Instead, uni-
lateral, informal representations from individual executive directors to 
Bank management at an early stage in the evolution of a controversy are 
often more effective in obtaining measurable progress than are formal 
board-level votes. Indeed, the timely threat of a "no" vote can be con-
siderably more effective than a negative vote actually cast. 
Because the Bank is formally accountable to its member governments, 
those policy interventions that come from a variety of countries are much 
more effective than those originating from a single Bank member. As 
an important corollary to this principle, demands from directly affected 
members of the public in borrowing countries carry a legitimacy that 
is difficult to deny. Communications from front-line, affected groups or 
individuals-who have a local perspective, often considerable firsthand 
factual information, and typically the most to lose-possess a particular 
credibility. When appeals from the public in recipient countries, in theory 
the intended beneficiaries of Bank lending, stand in opposition to the 
positions of their own governments, they create an uncomfortable kind 
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of cognitive dissonance for the Bank's management by forcing a choice 
between what can appear to be the parochial interest of the borrowing 
country government, on the one hand, and the Bank's stated mission of 
sustainable development, on the other. 
Partnership as a Legitimizing Factor 
The Bank's management naturally views borrowing country govern-
ments as an important constituency. Representations strictly on behalf of 
private groups in the United States and other industrialized countries are 
vulnerable to accusations pointing to "environmental imperialism" on 
the part of the Bank and borrowing country governments.15 Accordingly, 
Bank staff, implicitly or explicitly, may be unresponsive to interventions 
made purely by organizations in donor countries. Borrowing country 
governments, moreover, may dismiss environmental demands emanat-
ing from industrialized countries unless a direct connection with their 
own nationals is apparent. On the other hand, donor country advocacy 
NGOs have been quite successful in acting as intermediaries for directly 
affected local groups in borrowing countries, in part because of their 
greater leverage over their respective governments and therefore over 
the Bank's most powerful executive directors. Presumably for similar 
reasons, the Bank's resolution creating the new oversight mechanism, the 
Inspection Panel, specifies that only organizations in borrowing coun-
tries have "standing" to complain of the Bank's actions; in exceptional 
situations, Washington-based groups may nonetheless serve as local rep-
resentatives on behalf of affected foreign groups. 
Many of the substantive environmental problems confronted in the 
context of the Bank reform campaign are qualitatively different from 
those encountered in the United States and thus require skills and ex-
pertise that may be unfamiliar to NGOs based in industrialized countries. 
The World Bank loans of greatest concern can finance massive inter-
ventions in the natural environment, such as large dams and irrigation 
systems, of a scale that would be difficult to imagine domestically. In 
contrast to the situation in the United States, where issues of pollution 
are often paramount, questions of resource management are likely to be 
considerably more important in Third World countries. In the developing 
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world, where many environmental hazards are exacerbated by the twin 
pressures of poverty and population that are rarely decisive in the United 
States, inappropriate choices with respect to resource management 
may have serious consequences for public health and people's ability to 
provide for themselves and their families. The environmental dilemmas 
raised by Bank lending can cut to the very heart of national development 
priorities in economies that are often heavily dependent on the resource 
base and that emphasize export-led growth and development strategies. 
More often than not, Third World organizations have more experience 
working in these contexts than do their Northern counterparts and con-
sequently are more effective in identifying solutions to such local envi-
ronmental dilemmas. 
In addition to improving environmental quality, the World Bank 
reform campaign has the additional broad and deeply embedded aim 
of directly enhancing the democratic accountability to the public of a 
closed, technocratic institution. It is unthinkable that this goal could be 
achieved without the participation and support of those most directly 
affected by the Bank's activities. 
The campaign to reform the World Bank's .and regional banks' 
environmental practices has focused on both technical-substantive and 
process-accountability policy reforms. The former directly address sub-
stantive environmental issues such as pollution mitigation and forest 
conservation. The process agenda calls for greater public participation in 
the design and implementation of loans and improved access to informa-
tion generated and obtained by the development banks. Realization of 
process-accountability goals implies a wholesale democratization of the 
development-lending process as undertaken by both the Bank and the 
recipient country government. Certain elements of the environmental re-
form platform incorporate both types of considerations. For example, 
public participation and transparent policy decision making are central 
components of the methodology of environmental assessment both in 
the United States and abroad, which in turn has influenced the Bank's 
environmental policy. 16 
NGOs can facilitate the democratic decision-making agenda among 
themselves by cooperating and sharing information with other groups. 
More specifically, by creating access and leverage for locally based bor-
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rowing country groups, donor country NGOs can successfully empower 
their counterparts to demand what they cannot obtain directly from their 
own governments or from the Bank. There is variation between those 
North-South partnerships that end up empowering Southern partners 
and those that do not or that do so to a lesser degree. Not all partner-
ships are equally empowering, nor are all equally accountable to the 
communities most affected by Bank projects or policies (see Brown and 
Fox, chapter 12, this volume). Nevertheless, the indirect route by which 
Washington-based organizations act as interlocutor with the U.S. gov-
ernment and the World Bank, although perhaps a second best alter-
native, is often a more effective mechanism for Third World activists to 
achieve access than is dialogue with their own governments. 
Partnership Advocacy in Practice 
The World Bank campaigns include politically diverse constituencies. 
Among advocacy groups, it is possible to identify two reasonably distinct 
subperspectives: ( 1) reformists who by and large accept the reality of the 
continued existence of the international financial institutions, at least for 
the medium term; and (2) abolitionists who tend to identify their goals 
as elimination of the multilaterals altogether. 17 This distinction may be 
more philosophical than practical, and in some cases the two approaches 
seem to coexist within the same organization. In fact, the abolitionists 
can create a radical pole that makes the reformists appear more moderate 
and "reasonable," thereby enhancing their effectiveness. (For distinctions 
among the more moderate NGOs and those participating in the official 
World Bank-NGO Committee, see Covey's chapter, this volume.) As the 
terrain of advocacy shifts beyond preventing or mitigating disasters to 
promoting the implementation of "reformed" social and environmental 
policies, it will be interesting to see if such mutually reinforcing dynamics 
are sustained. 
Since the partnership advocacy approach emerged in the mid-1980s, 
Northern and Southern NGOs have gradually increased their levels of 
coordination and collaboration. Since 1986, NGOs from around the world 
have attended parallel convocations coinciding with the World Bank/ 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) annual meetings. 18 In recent years, 
the NGO alternative annual meetings have expanded in participation 
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and focus to include not just environmental organizations, but also church 
groups and development NGOs, and they increasingly have taken up 
broader policy issues, such as structural adjustment. These meetings have 
been a major opportunity to formulate joint agendas, often memorialized 
in formal statements. One outgrowth of these annual NGO assemblies 
was a broad advocacy campaign to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the 
founding of the World Bank and the IMF. Challenging the World Bank's 
institutional capacity to perform its stated mission, the "Fifty Years Is 
Enough" campaign highlighted the "strongly held belief by growing 
numbers of people around the globe that the type of development that 
the World Bank and the IMF have been promoting cannot be allowed to 
continue."19 Structured as a coordinated cluster of national or regional 
campaigns, this global effort gained more than 140 organizational mem-
bers in the United States and more than 170 foreign affiliates in about 
thirty countries. This endeavor triggered a direct response from the Bank, 
which issued its own vision statement. 20 
North-South NGO partnerships are not the only critical components 
of Bank reform campaigns. Coordination among advocacy groups in 
diverse donor countries is also essential for achieving policy change. As 
noted above, the Bank's governance structure requires coordinated ad-
vocacy efforts in North America, Europe, and Japan to pursue environ-
mental change agendas to influence borrowing governments, which in 
turn are often skeptical of, if not resistant to, policy reform. Western 
European governments have only recently begun to become more re-
sponsive to environmental reform agendas driven by coordinated NGO 
efforts to target their finance and foreign aid officials as entry points into 
the World Bank's decision-making process. The Sierra Club developed a 
close partn~rship with Euronature, a German organization with offices in 
Bonn and Brussels that has been active on World Bank-related matters 
in eastern Europe. Similarly, the German groups Urgewald and World 
Economy, Ecology, and Development (WEED) have played influential 
roles in Germany, often coordinating World Bank campaign strategy 
with the Environmental Defense Fund in Washington. National NGO 
networks in Britain, France, Holland, Italy, Norway, and Sweden are 
also working to influence the policies of their national representatives at 
the World Bank. 
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A number of U.S. NGOs have created pools of money to be used for 
small grants to counterpart organizations in developing countries. Small 
amounts of money can go very far in the Third World, thereby sub-
stantially increasing the human resource base abroad. Starting in 1986, 
the Environmental Policy Institute (now Friends of the Earth-U.S.), the 
Environmental Defense Fund, the National Wildlife Federation, the Bank 
Information Center, and the Global Greengrants Fund each developed 
funds for awarding small grants, distributing at least several hundred 
thousand dollars to counterparts in developing countries for on-the-
ground capacity building, travel, computers, operating expenses, and 
training. 
Some NGOs by their very nature have a multinational character, 
which makes for natural partnership relationships. One of the most 
active in Bank reform efforts is the Friends of the Earth (FOE), currently 
a worldwide federation of fifty-two national affiliates (the Philippine 
affiliate is central to the discussion in Royo's chapter and the Italian 
branch is discussed in Keck's chapter, this volume). Approximately 40 
percent of these sister groups are located in developing countries. The 
yearly assembly of FOE affiliates is an occasion for setting a joint agenda, 
building consensus, sharing information, updating the campaign, under-
taking new initiatives, and adopting resolutions. The World Wide Fund 
for Nature (formerly World Wildlife Fund) is a family of twenty-eight 
national organizations (NOs) that share finances, information, and pub-
lications; it also coordinates multilateral development bank advocacy 
work among its affiliates as well as with other Northern advocacy 
NGOs. Greenpeace International, whose headquarters is located in 
Amsterdam, coordinates international, regional, and national campaign 
activities in forty-three offices in thirty-two developed and developing 
countries. The social change-oriented Oxford Committee for Famine 
Relief (Oxfam) international NGO network has also become very influ-
ential, especially on debt and structural adjustment issues. 
Sardar Sarovar: The Paradigm Project Campaign 
An excellent example of the case study approach to partnership advocacy 
is the campaign around the Sardar Sarovar Dam on India's Narmada 
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River, which focused on a 1985 World Bank loan of $450 million.21 The 
Sardar Sarovar Dam, the centerpiece of a huge and complex multidam 
project, quickly became the subject of heated environmental and human 
rights controversy. 
In many ways, the Narmada campaign became a paradigm of project-
specific partnership advocacy. Indiari nongovernmental organizations 
. and citizens in the region banded together in an aggressive and vocal 
grassroots coalition known as Narmada Bachao Andolan (Save the 
Narmada Movement) and made repeated threats that they would perish 
voluntarily before accepting forced resettlement. The movement's chief 
spokesperson, Medha Patkar, has achieved the status of a global celeb-
rity.22 In December 1990 and January 1991, thousands of tribal peoples, 
oustees, and their supporters staged a "Long March" to the dam site that 
was interrupted by the police and military. The high level of organization 
at the local and national level, however, guaranteed a steady flow of both 
factual information and local perspectives from those. affected by the 
project. 
This solid, sustained, in-country base facilitated the efficacy of 
Northern partners on behalf qf their Indian constituents. In most such 
campaigns, the first representations are typically made to the Bank's 
professional staff, which has the capability to affect appreciably the bor-
rowing country's behavior.23 On its own initiative, management may 
even discontinue disbursements for loans that have been approved by the 
board of executive directors or, in the case of proposed loans that have 
not yet been considered by that body, suspend or terminate negotiations 
with the borrowing country. Because the Bank's management has this 
significant degree of power, it is often desirable to communicate at the 
staff level in the beginning of a campaign to exhaust this remedy from 
a procedural point of view, even if the outcome is likely to be unsatis-
factory. In the Sardar Sarovar case, sustained interventions with Bank 
staff and with upper-level management in 1988 led to a high-level mis-
sion to India. 
A second strategy in the Sardar Sarovar campaign involved efforts 
to influence ministers, parliamentarians, and other representatives of 
national governments in key Bank member states, to whom the individ-
ual executive directors are ultimately accountable.24 On October 24, 
·. 
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1989, U.S. Representative James H. Scheuer (D-N.Y.) chaired a special 
oversight hearing on the Sardar Sarovar Dam.25 In April 1990, NGOs 
organized an International Narmada Symposium in Tokyo, an important 
venue because the Japanese government was cofinancing the project. 
More than twenty members of the Japanese Diet wrote to then-World 
Bank President Barber Conable demanding an end to Bank funding for 
the dam. Similar activities in Europe resulted in communications from 
members of the Swedish Parliament and the European Parliament. 
A third strategy involved systematic attempts to influence the executive 
directors individually and, ultimately, to affect the decisions of the board 
of executive directors as a body. After direct communications from 
Indian nationals and Washington-based groups, the former and present 
(as of this writing) Dutch executive directors became personally interested 
in the potential adverse effects of the Sardar Sarovar loan. In the next 
stage, representations were made directly to the Bank's governors, indi-
vidually or collectively. So, during the World Bank/IMF annual meeting 
in Washington, a full-page, open letter to World Bank President Lewis 
Preston, endorsed by 250 signatories from thirty-seven countries, ap-
peared in the Financial Times, demanding that the World Bank "with-
draw from Sardar Sarovar immediately" and challenging donor country 
contributions to the World Bank.26 
A fourth strategy involved ·international media publicity and public 
education, both crucial elements in the NGO campaign on the Narmada 
projects. For instance, in 1992 the Environmental Defense Fund and the 
Bank Information Center created the Narmada International Human 
Rights Panel to monitor and publicize human rights abuses in the region. 
During the 1992 monsoon season, members visited the dam area and 
reported on human rights violations, including a fatal shooting of a tribal 
woman by local authorities. The Narmada campaign also worked with 
established human rights networks, such as the Lawyers Committee for 
Human Rights. 
Key members of the Bank's board, faced with sharply conflicting 
"facts" on the project from Bank staff and NGOs, took the unprece-
dented step of encouraging Bank management to commission an inde-
pendent expert review. Led by Bradford Morse, former administrator of 
UNDP, with Thomas Berger, a noted Canadian human rights lawyer, 
64 David A. Wirth 
as deputy chair, the independent review confirmed much of the NGO 
critique and called for the Bank to "step back" from the project-a high 
point for the case study-based advocacy campaign approach.27 
Bank management nonetheless decided to continue to fund the proj-
ects.28 It subsequently decided to make continued disbursement of the 
1985 loan conditional on improvements in resettlement before the end of 
March of 1993, a step that Morse opposed. The Bank's board voted on 
October 23, 1992, to continue funding the project despite the objections 
of executive directors representing 42 percent of the Bank's voting 
power-including directors from the United States, Germany, Japan, 
Australia, Canada, and the Nordic countries.29 On March JO, 1993, the 
deadline for the implementation of the resettlement reforms, the Indian 
executive director requested the Bank to cancel the remaining disburse-
ments of $170 million and announced that the government of India 
would finance the remainder of the project by itself. Apparently playing 
its part in a behind-the-scenes deal, the Bank reasserted its confidence 
that India had nonetheless satisfied the benchmark conditions precedent 
for the continued receipt of funds under the loan.30 
The Narmada campaign gave the NGO campaign the leverage needed 
to encourage broader procedural reforms at the World Bank. The cam-
paign revealed widespread flaws in the content or implementation of 
key Bank policies-such as those governing environmental assessment, 
forced resettlement, the treatment of indigenous peoples, and access to 
information. The Bank's abdication of responsibility with respect to 
human rights issues highlighted the multilateral institution's longstanding 
policy of asserting its legally constrained capacity to respond to human 
rights violations in its decision-making processes. The campaign also 
raised issues about the Bank's inconsistent treatment of violations of loan 
agreements. 31 Seen as but the most visible recent example of systemic 
deficiencies in project quality and implementation documented in the 
Bank's internal Wapenhans Report,32 the Sardar Sarovar project created 
an opening for Washington-based NGOs to argue that the Bank's fund-
ing should be curtailed. 33 The history of the project also exposed the 
barren cynicism behind the Bank's argument of last resort, namely that 
the institution's continued presence can nevertheless leverage improve-
ment in borrower performance. If, as in the Sardar Sarovar case, this 
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"We can do bad projects better than anyone else" philosophy is carried 
to its logical conclusion, there is no loan so flawed or fundamentally un-
sound that the Bank should refuse to fund it. As a result, the Narmada 
campaign generated the momentum needed to catalyze both the creation 
of the Inspection Panel and the adoption of a more open public informa-
tion policy (see Udall chapter, this volume). 
Policy Reform at the National Level in Donor States 
Early on in the environmental reform campaign, the potentially pivotal 
role of the U.S. government, the World Bank's single largest shareholder, 
was well appreciated. It goes without saying that the U.S. government 
will likely be more responsive to input from U.S. citizens than from for-
eign nationals. Thanks largely to the work of U.S. public interest orga-
nizations and bipartisan support among lawmakers, the U.S. Congress 
has been quite active for the past decade in enacting legislation specifi-
cally targeted at encouraging environmental reform of the World Bank 
and other international financial institutions. The principal strategies 
employed in legislation to maximize U.S. influence in these multilateral 
institutions are ( 1) policy-based instructions to representatives of the 
United States, such as the U.S. executive director to the World Bank; (2) 
voting restrictions and mandates to those representatives; and (3) con-
ditions on U.S. contributions to these multilateral institutions. Of the 
three, the "power of the purse" has generally been regarded as the most 
effective vehicle for transmitting directives and expectations in a form 
that will have the greatest impact on the Bank's management. In large 
measure, this perception accounts for the major role played by the Ap-
propriations Committees in both houses of the Congress on the World 
Bank environmental reform issue. 
A set of hortatory recommendations was the first conduit through 
which Congress articulated its expectations with respect to environmen-
tal reform at the World Bank and the regional development banks.34 
A series of binding appropriations measures have since been an an-
nual feature of the appropriations cycle for the World Bank and other 
international financial institutions. 35 In 1987, permanent authorizing 
legislation was signed into law, directing U.S. representatives to the 
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development banks to promote improved environmental performance by 
these institutions, including the adoption of environmental impact as-
sessment (EIA) procedures. All these measures also require the involve-
ment of the local public and health and environment ministers · from 
borrowing countries in project design, improved access to information, 
and strict monitoring and enforcement. 
A particularly noteworthy development on the legislative front was the 
enactment of the International Development and Finance Act of 1989, 
containing the so-called Pelosi Amendment, named after its principal 
congressional sponsor. This statutory authority requires the U.S. De-
partment of the Treasury to promote the adoption of procedures that 
improve public access to EIAs at the World Bank, as well as at the re-
gional development banks for Africa, Asia, eastern Europe, and Latin 
America. Effective December 19, 1991, two years after enactment, the 
Pelosi Amendment also prohibits the U.S. director of any multilateral 
development bank from voting for a proposed loan unless an EIA has 
been prepared 120 days before the vote and disseminated to the public. 
The purpose of this law is not primarily to trigger a negative vote by the 
Unit~d States or the rejection of a loan proposal, but to encourage the 
development banks to adopt improved policies. U.S. abstentions with 
respect to votes with MDBs because of the requirements of the Pelosi 
amendment have declined since the amendment's passage. In 1995, the 
United States did not abstain on Pelosi grounds from any projects, com-
pared to its abstention from 17 percent of projects in 1992. 
The U.S. executive branch, and particularly the Department of the 
Treasury-the executive department with principal responsibility for re-
lations between the U.S. government and the MDBs-has been similarly 
supportive of the environmental reform agenda at the World Bank and 
the regional banks during the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton presidencies. 
For example, when James A. Baker III was Reagan's secretary of the 
treasury, he authorized intervention at the board level on a number of 
specific development bank loans, both those that had already been ap-
proved and those that were proposed for approval but had yet to be 
implemented. Baker also authorized the adoption of a series of specific 
generic standards for MDB projects that harm specific sensitive ecosys-
tems-including tropical forests, tropical wetlands, and grasslands-
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with the goal of leveraging further policy reform at these multilateral 
institutions through the exercise of U.S. voting power. Significantly, 
these voting instructions were drafted with a high degree of input from 
American NGOs. 
The 1994 congressional elections brought the Republicans to power in 
Congress and reshaped the terrain for advocacy. The bipartisan basis of 
reform efforts in the Congress had relied, in part, on a coalition between 
environmentalists and Republican foreign aid critics, a coalition that 
became much more difficult for many environmental NGOs to sustain 
after 1994, particularly when the Republican majority started attacking 
domestic environmental programs. The dominant Republican attitude 
expressed itself primarily, if not exclusively, as an anti-aid agenda, rather 
than a strategy for using appropriations as a means of leveraging reform 
at the Bank. Without leverage in the Congress, partnership advocacy 
became more difficult in the United States. 
Lessons Learned and Questions Unanswered 
The partnership advocacy model has plainly been a successful strategy 
for NGOs to catalyze environmental reform at the World Bank. The 
teamwork of borrowing country groups and U.S. NGOs allows for a 
division of labor that synergistically magnifies the impact of each part-
ner's contribution. In an ideal case, Southern groups bring legitimacy, 
local perspective, and on-the-ground information to the table, whereas 
their U.S. counterparts provide political access, leverage, media coverage, 
and an international policy perspective based on accumulated experience 
that is not confined to a particular country or project, In interactions 
with third parties-most notably the Bank's professional staff and bor-
rowing country governments-the collaboration can take positions that 
are both representative of local interests and strategically and technically 
well informed. Within the international NGO movement, the partner-
ship approach seeks to assure accountability to those with the most at 
stake and the true beneficiaries of the reform effort, namely the public in 
borrowing countries. 
But precisely because of the accomplishments of the World Bank envi-
ronmental reform campaign spearheaded by NGOs and the partnership 
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advocacy model that has been a principal strategy for achieving those 
successes, a large number of second-order dilemmas have emerged. For 
whatever reason-because they have not arisen in a concrete setting, be-
cause they are not considered important, or because they have not been 
given much thought-these somewhat more sophisticated challenges have 
received little or no attention from the NGO community. 
One of the more salient of these dilemmas concerns the authority of 
Northern groups to represent their Southern partners. The partnership 
advocacy model anticipates the formation among private actors of ad 
hoc, voluntary relationships. Although a standard based on accumulated 
practice and custom may emerge over time, there are now no explicit, 
objective ethical criteria applicable to these collaborations like those 
that govern the attorney-client relationship. For some groups, and cer-
tainly for U.S. groups, the role of representing the interests of others, as 
opposed to their own goals and those of their members, has been a 
somewhat uneasy one, although tensions may have abated through the 
years as groups have learned how to work together. 
The Bank's board of executive directors has addressed this con-
sideration directly through the mechanism of the World Bank's new In-
spection Panel. The resolution creating the panel expressly provides that 
only "an affected party in the territory of the borrower" may initiate a 
request for inspection. The resolution anticipates that the complainant 
(i.e., the affected party) may have a local representative in Washington, 
or elsewhere if it contends that appropriate representation is not locally 
available and the executive directors agree at the time they consider the 
request for inspection. 
Another significant concern is the appropriate role of Northern orga-
nizations iµ donor countries such as the United States, which do not 
borrow from the Bank but which have the most influence at the in-
stitution because they are the source of the Bank's capital. It is clear that 
most, if not all, environmental advocacy organizations in industrialized 
donor states have their own policy priorities and do not regard them-
selves as mere agents of their partners in World Bank borrowing coun-
tries. Donor country NGOs have their own worries about the propriety 
and efficacy of the use of their own tax monies to fund the World Bank's 
overseas operations. The priorities of potential Southern and Northern 
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partners may overlap or coincide with those of counterpart groups in 
other nations, but ultimately each NGO decides its program for itself. 
These considerations suggest that an NGO in a donor country should 
be free to refuse an overture from a potential collaborator in a borrowing 
country because of divergent perspectives. If differences arise after a more 
or less formal partnership relationship has been formed, however, there 
may be complications. In such a case, if the U.S.-based organization, 
acting both in a representative capacity and on its own behalf, were to 
withdraw or abandon the undertaking, the interests of the borrowing 
country organization may be severely compromised, especially when that 
organization cannot identify a new collaborator. This counsels both 
special attention to the identification of a common agenda at the part-
nership formation stage, as well as a shared understanding of how to 
sustain and, perhaps, eventually terminate the relationship. 
Although this approach might seem suitable to a project-specific in-
tervention, more serious conceptual difficulties arise in the formation of 
partnerships targeting broader Bank policies that affect the public in all 
borrowing countries. One difficulty concerns whether Washington-based 
groups should or must take into account divergent opinions among 
the NGO community worldwide, and if so, how. Indeed, there is some 
question whether a worldwide NGO community consensus can be identi-
fied, especially considering the diversity among potential public interest-
oriented parters. But as NGO efforts become increasingly sophisticated 
and successful, as more is at stake in NGO dealings with the World 
Bank, and as the diversity of the NGO movement worldwide expands 
with an increasingly wide array of viewpoints on an ever-growing number 
of subjects, the issue of North-South NGO accountability on policy ad-
vocacy issues becomes more likely to arise. 
Those U.S. groups that have contemplated the matter appear to have a 
"let a thousand flowers bloom" philosophy. In other words, each group, 
both in borrowing and donor countries, is free to choose its own collabo-
rators. There is a tension between the obvious necessity for Northern 
activists to be anchored by alliances with their Southern analogues in 
borrowing countries and the practical impossibility of representing every 
NGO in the world. Moreover, some disagreements are bound to arise. 
In the environmental area alone, active organizations encompass both 
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field-based groups with operational, on-the-ground missions and advo-
cacy organizations whose goal is broad policy reform. Within the subset 
of environmental advocacy groups, some believe that reform of the 
World Bank is possible, whereas others express profound skepticism 
that the Bank and other international financial institutions will ever serve 
as affirmative vehicles for preserving and improving environmental 
quality. 
This laissez-faire approach does have some drawbacks. In some situa-
tions, it may be difficult to identify a minimal level of consensus in the 
borrowing country-thereby inviting the question, Is a shared in-country 
perspective a desirable or necessary precondition to intervention by 
Northern groups? Identifying the "public interest" and a public-policy 
advocacy agenda is uniquely difficult under such circumstances. When 
there is no agreement arriong local groups, an ancillary issue is whether a 
Washington-based organization can or should avoid exacerbating fac-
tions or divisions among in-country NGOs. Yet another question that 
may arise in such turbulent circumstances is the extent to which repre-
sentatives of any one group in fact have been deputize~ to speak for 
their own constituencies, let alone for any others. Widespread sharing of 
information with other groups-even those with divergent viewpoints-
may at least improve the situation. 
At the other end of the spectrum, the "thousand flowers" philosophy 
quite obviously invites the possibility of marginalizing dissident voices 
that cannot find counterparts in donor states.36 Both dilemmas suggest 
that a necessary, although not always sufficient, condition for a U.S. 
group to become involved in an overseas controversy is a thorough 
knowledge of the country concerned. There are also indications from 
past partnership experiences that action does not always match rhetoric 
when highly technical matters are at stake, such as end-use energy effi-
ciency in alternatives to Bank-financed power projects. Although part-
nerships have been highly successful on project campaigns, as in the 
Narmada case, when it comes to broader policy-level advocacy, NGO 
technical and information-gathering capacity is limited. These considera-
tions counsel against the creation of "marriages of convenience" and 
instead suggest the advisability of long-term partnerships in which the 
collaborators learn to know each other well on a day-to-day basis before 
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initiating potentially stressful confrontations with sophisticated institu-
tions like the World Bank. 
There is no longer any question but that North-South partnerships can 
and do work in practice, and the necessity for such collaborations as a 
matter of principle is now well accepted. But these lessons only invite yet 
another tier of trenchant second-order questions, themselves large in 
number and with, as yet, only incomplete answers. Although to a certain 
extent the nature of partnership relationships will vary depending on the 
context, several other unresolved generic concerns can also be identified: 
• What attributes, if any, should the proposed partner organizations 
have before such a relationship is formed? For instance, how representa-
tive of local opinion should or must the borrowing country organization 
be? 
• Is it relevant that either or both of the partners receive financial 
support from governments or have contractual relationships with the 
World Bank? 
• How should a partnership relationship be established? 
• What are appropriate terms for a partnership relationship? 
• What, if any, objective indicia should there be to demonstrate that such 
a relationship has been established? 
• What obligations do partner organizations have toward each other? 
• Under what conditions should the partner be consulted before major 
decisions are made? 
• Under what circumstances may the partners purport to represent each 
other? 
• Is there a difference between active representation of a partner and 
sympathetic expressions of support for the partner's position? 
• Should the partnership relationship imply a commitment of financial 
resources, and, if so, what kind of commitment? 
• What sort of consultative process, if any, should donor country groups 
engage in before expressing their views on generic policies adopted by the 
Bank and other international financial institutions? 
• What obligations, if any, do the partners have to third parties, such 
as in-country NGOs with divergent views, that may be interested in the 
partners' activities? 
Based on previous experience, it is unlikely that the NGO community 
will address these issues in abstract terms. Rather, it will be fascinating to 
observe the partnership advocacy model as experience accumulates. 
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After a decade and a half of forming advocacy partnerships around 
World Bank issues, the NGO community has developed a significant 
capacity to identify destructive projects before they happen and some-
times even to stop them. The case study approach has succeeded in con-
tributing to the change or creation of Bank policies in a range of areas. 
NGOs have developed a sophisticated network of trip wires to identify 
problem projects, a global communications network to link local grass-
roots activists and skilled lobbyists, and a well-developed capability to 
use the media. 
The partnership advocacy model will need to adapt to a new set of 
"second-generation" challenges to NGO Bank campaigns. Having suc-
cessfully pressured the Bank to adopt social and environmental reform 
policies, the main challenge now, in many cases, is to hold the Bank and 
borrower governments accountable for the full implementation of those 
commitments. This kind of advocacy requires not only informed and 
capable local communities throughout an area where a project is im-
plemented, but also effective "real-time" monitoring capabilities, which 
in tur_n require greater organizational capacity at all levels, from the 
directly affected communities up through the provincial and national 
capitals to Washington, D.C. Making the transition from doing damage 
control to holding the World Bank accountable to its policy reform 
commitments poses a key challenge for future partnership advocacy. 
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